Early modern medicine favoured flight as the best prophylactic against epidemic disease. Theologically, however, flight savoured of an attempt to defy divine providence, or a dereliction of Christian charity, while staying could seem an act of presumption or recklessness. This essay studies six theologians whose writings on the issue circulated in sixteenth-century England. Long dismissed as inconclusive and derivative, these 'flight theologies' can be better understood as products of theological principle and communal experience, whose combined influence precluded definitive prescriptions. Instead, authors marshalled the rhetoric of 'conscience' to displace the decision back onto their readers, while retaining interpretive authority over the key factors of Scripture and personal obligations. Flight theology thus seeks less to solve a practical problem, than to produce a particular kind of political subjectivity, bound to the community and predicated on persuasion. In so doing, the discourse fuelled the emergence of an early modern English public sphere.
Introduction
'I met with wagones, Cartes, & Horses full loden with yong barnes, for fear of the blacke Pestilence, with their boxes of Medicens and sweete perfume. O God, how fast did thei run by hundredes, and were afraied of eche other for feare of smityng.' 1 So Mendicus, a character in William Bullein's Dialogue against the Feuer Pestilence (1564), describes the roads outside London in plague-time. Such exoduses were not a figment of Bullein's imagination: the jurist Christopher Hales wrote that he had never seen London so deserted as it was during the plague of 1532. 2 For the early modern European, '[e]xperience and the medical teachings of Hippocrates and Galen pointed unambiguously to flight as the best way of avoiding epidemics'. 3 Flight was already an established expedient in the Spencer J. Weinreich is a doctoral student in the history of science at Princeton University, studying early modern Europe and focusing on prisons, disease and Reformation theology. His work has appeared in Early Science and Medicine, Names, The Journal of Ecclesiastical History and Gothic Studies, and is forthcoming in the Journal of the History of Ideas. He serves as an editor for JHIBlog, the blog attached to the Journal of the History of Ideas. * Department of History, Princeton University, 129 Dickinson Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA. E-mail: sjw2@prince ton.edu communities-although a few Catholic theologians, such as the Basler Ludwig Bä r, did tackle the issue. 10 The sixteenth century is chosen to complement the predominance of the seventeenth in the literature on plague in early modern England.
What has not been sufficiently appreciated hitherto is the communal experience of disease undergirding these texts, composed and published during or just after epidemic events (see Table 1 ). 11 Disease was a familiar presence in early modern communities, which 'would experience an epidemic of plague approximately every decade, and a serious devastation once in every generation'. 12 Writers and readers thus shared a hard-won body of knowledge about plague, which acted as a check on impulses toward universal conclusions. 13 Flight theologians, however doctrinally diverse, all stake out uneasy and broadly similar viae mediae between the faithlessness of flight and the presumptuousness of refusal. Why, then, the continued stream of writings? I argue that flight theology was a means for communal leaders to do intellectual and political work-keeping order, regulating societal morals, attacking confessional opponents-above and beyond answering a practical question. Theologians cast the problem as one of 'conscience', displacing the decision onto the individual while retaining authority to interpret the Bible and personal obligations-the two principal factors governing the choice. In so doing, flight theology tapped into, and accelerated, an ongoing redefinition of the line between public and private. Much of what the modern individual thinks of as 'private' was open to public scrutiny in the sixteenth century, and had been so for generations. 14 But the early modern period saw a transformation in what 'public' meant. W. J. Torrance Kirby traces the emergence of a 'culture of persuasion', wherein ethical work was transacted communally, through written and oral argumentation. 15 It is not just that flight was public in the sense of being visible to the community. Flight theology made it arguable in terms of the common interest, in keeping with the rhetoric of the 'commonwealth' that pervaded contemporary public politicking, as well as the individual's salvation. 16 Consider that the protagonist of Bullein's Dialogue, is called Civis ('Citizen'), rather than 'Everyman' or 'Christian'. 17 Properly politicised, epidemics could reshape communities and create shared identities. 18 In reacting to crises through textual production, flight theology was an early manifestation of the English 'public sphere', the growing number of 'spaces for or modes of communication or pitch making in which appeals to a general audience were made through a variety of media, appealing to a notion of the public good (or religious truth)'. 19 Kirby links this 'public sphere' to the tenets of reformed theology. Having stripped the visible Church of its monopoly on salvific power, Protestantism entailed a shift in 'moral ontology' from priests and sacraments to the individual. Thus the 'culture of persuasion': the Word was the only proper intermediary between the individual and God, words the only proper way to influence the individual. 20 Without prescribing a course of action, theologians could provide tools for navigating the interrelations of conscience, Scripture and experience. At the same time, in priming readers to think, even in emergencies, in communal terms, flight theology conditions them as participants in the public sphere, participants who affirm the new moral ontology-in short, persuadable subjects. 21
Aetiology: Squaring a Circle
The first task for the flight theologian was to understand the nature of the peril. Theologians were broadly in agreement with one another on the aetiology of disease, particularly that God's will played a fundamental role. Taken to its logical extreme, however, this principle could lead to fatalism, and conflicted with the observed efficacy of medical measures. At the same time, too heavy an emphasis on plague as a natural phenomenon jarred with the period's ubiquitous providentialism and what was (not) known about the spread of disease. The result is equivocation, which reveals itself to be a reasonable response to the available information. 22 No theologian, of flight or anything else, denied that the ultimate cause of disease was the divine will-nor, for that matter, did the physicians of the age. 23 For the early modern believer, Alexandra Walsham writes, 'History was a canvas on which the Lord etched His purposes and intentions, nature a textbook and a laboratory in which He taught, demonstrated, and tested His providence'. 24 A fortiori this included epidemics: think of the renderings of plague as an arrow loosed from heaven. But did heavenly causation preclude natural or secondary causes-for an epidemic, unwholesome environments, astral influences and so on? A singular event like the 1580 Dover Straits Earthquake, characterized by 'the sudden rarenesse of the thing', readily lent itself to interpretation as a portent 'created by the deity outside the order of nature'. 25 Long experience with epidemics, however, made plague harder to divorce from natural factors. As Holland reasons, 'If there come into the pestilence no natural causes, then these whom the plague hath infected, cannot doubtlesse so much as be eased, much lesse be healed by naturall remedies. But this second to be verie false, experience & common sense do dailie tell vs.' 26 The solution was a combination of divine and natural factors, exemplified by Osiander's formulation: 'naturall causes do somwhat also thereto, yet is it sure and vndouted, that the same causes be sent and stered vp oute of Gods wrath'. 27 Every piece of flight theology available in sixteenth-century England attributed some explanatory power to natural factors-and not for lack of strong accounts of providence in the theologies of men like Luther, Hooper or Beza. 28 As for providence's contribution, early modern divines distinguished between 'general' and 'particular' providences. The former referred to God's overarching guidance of the cosmos, while the latter variously denoted his intentions for humanity or the Church, or his interventions 'to uphold the moral order and to admonish, chastise, and reward man and womankind'. 29 29 Walsham, Providence, 12.
How (Not) to Survive a Plague general, and an ongoing outbreak in particular, occurred as a scheduled part of the divine plan or as an ad hoc response to human affairs (to wit, human iniquity).
A sermon or tract was obviously far more forceful if it could allege direct divine attention, and so authors tended to opt for plague as a particular providence. 30 'Your sinnes cause the pestilence', Holland bluntly informs his readers. Some were quite specific about this: Holland goes on to enumerate some 12 causes of the 1593 outbreak, among them 'ignorance, contempt & negligence in the pure worship of God', 'spirituall and corporall whoredome, and all superstition whatsoeuer' and 'the affliction & grieuance of Gods people'. 31 Yet, rhetorically useful though plague-as-particular-providence was, it proved difficult to sustain when theory met reality. Was dying of the pestilence a sign of God's displeasure, survival a token of his favour? For a community that saw a godly person succumb or a known scoundrel survive, divine justice might come into question; for parishioners who saw a loved one perish, doubts about their salvation might be unbearable. 32 While some commentators accepted such difficulties as the inevitable outworkings of providentialism, others resorted to elaborate rationalisations. The controversial London preacher Henoch Clapham posited the existence of two plagues: one natural, the other divine-the former deadly to the godly and the reprobate alike. 33 Not dissimilarly, Osiander postulates two kinds of death: 'One waye, after the commune course of nature, accordynge as euery mans death is appoynted hym of God. . . . Another waye . . . before the tyme, by reason of hys great & greuous synnes.' 34 Neither scheme allows for a definitive judgement in specific cases-species of plagues and deaths being indistinguishable to every eye except the Almighty's-but providentialism's more awkward consequences are mitigated.
For a moral problem-sin-moral remedies: repentance, prayer and (within Protestant limits) good works. The implication of catastrophe-as-punishment was that amendment would win God's mercy. 35 Of course, the decision to flee factored into the calculus of divine justice: precipitous flight from a plague sent as a punishment, abandoning one's neighbours in the process, piled sin atop sin, inviting God to redouble said punishments. 36 Osiander explained, 'The farther we departe from the loue of our neghboure, the mor we lade synne vpon vs, and deserue thys plage but the more.' But, simultaneously, 'the more diligentlye that we take hede vnto the loue of oure neghboure, the surer shall we be'. 37 Individual decisions had consequences for the entire community.
Theological considerations were also thought to influence the medical fortunes of particular individuals. Preventatives and remedies were efficacious only if combined with faith; 'they (where fayth is not) may euen assoone do harme as good'. 38 Luther, Osiander and Bä r all agreed that those who risked their lives to care for the sick tended 30 Ibid., 157. 31 Holland, Spirituall Preseruatiues, A8 r , D1 v -D4 r . 32 Walsham, Providence, 162. 33 Ibid., 160. 34 Osiander, How and Whither, C4 r . 35 Walsham, Providence, 116. to be preserved. 39 The inverse was also true, according to Hooper: those vitiated by sin were especially vulnerable to contagion. 40 But a sufficiently providentialist aetiology would obviate the issue of flight altogether, because it was predicated on contagion as a material phenomenon. 41 If plague struck by the Lord's express decision, then proximity to infected persons or environments was irrelevant. More to the point, what human expedient could hope to forestall divine judgement? Hooper counters classical authorities' endorsement of flight with theological certainty: 'I know that Moses by the worde of god, sayeth. Flee whether thou wylte, in case y u take wyth the, the contempt of god, & breache of his commaundement, god shall fynde the oute.' 42 In the frontispiece to Thomas Dekker's A rod for run-awayes (1625) (Figure 1 ) , a group of departing Londoners cry, 'We fly', only to have a triumphant Death retort, 'I follow'.
Here the empirical evidence offered grounds for scepticism: Beza observes that not all who fled escaped death, nor did all who stayed succumb. But nor could the efficacy of flight be wholly denied, and only a few pages later Beza recognises it as 'one of the very chiefe among naturall remedies and prouisoes in infectious diseases'. 43 And it was not just flight that was at risk: too strong a providentialist account of disease might foster a dangerous neglect of all practical measures. If the plague strikes only at divine command, why use any kind of cure or prophylaxis? The favoured object lesson was a supposed Muslim fatalism: it was widely believed that 'Turks' regarded plagues as emanations of the divine will, which alone could provide relief. Consequently, they took no precautions and used no remedies-and so died by the thousands. 44 For that matter, why should such trust in providence be restricted to plague-time? Luther's vision of fatalism run amok is worth quoting at length: By such reasoning, when a house is on fire, no one should run outside or rush to help because such a fire is also a punishment from God. Anyone who falls into deep water dare not save himself by swimming but must surrender to the water as to a divine punishment. . . . Likewise, if someone breaks a leg, is wounded or bitten, he should not seek medical aid but say, 'It is God's punishment. I shall bear it until it heals by itself.' Freezing weather and winter are also God's punishment and can cause death. Why run to get inside or near a fire? Be strong and stay outside until it becomes warm again. We should then need no apothecaries or drugs or physicians because all illnesses are punishment from God. . . . Why do you eat and drink instead of letting yourself be punished until hunger and thirst stop of themselves? Ultimately such talk will lead to the point where we abbreviate the Lord's Prayer and no longer pray, ' How (Not) to Survive a Plague evil, Amen,' since we would have to stop praying to be saved from hell and stop seeking to escape it. It, too, is God's punishment as is every kind of evil. 45 Luther's customary sarcasm notwithstanding, the societal concerns he raises are real, as are the threats to the individual body and soul. 'He shall be greatly to be blamed, which rashlye casteth himselfe and his into the danger of infection, whenas the Apostle bearing witnesse, hee is worse then an Infidell, which hath not so great care ouer his, as . . . he ought to haue.' 46 Was it not, Luther demands, a form of suicide to refuse the means of preserving one's life, a form of murder to be responsible for infecting others? 47 God had appointed remedies by which human beings might combat disease. The justice of this critique was universally acknowledged, whether or not flight counted as a remedy, such that even the most providentialist accounts warn against forgoing medicine altogether. 48 The problem remained one of interpretation: whether a given outbreak was a trial or punishment, the proper response 'to rest confidently by faith in GOD', or a purely physical peril, refusal to flee from which was 'not trusting God but tempting him'. 49 Who was 45 Luther, 'Whether One May Flee', 124-5. 46 1 Tim 5:8. Beza, Treatize, A5 v . 47 Luther, 'Whether One May Flee', 126, 131. 48 Hooper, Homelye, C1 v -C2 r ; Slack, Impact of Plague, 42. 49 For the first quote, see Holland, Spirituall Preseruatiues, B2 r ; for the second, see Luther, 'Whether One May Flee ', 131. to say that the plague was a punishment to be borne, rather than a call to turn unto God (which might be accomplished through, or after, flight)? That flight was rebellion, rather than precisely what the Almighty wanted one to do? 50 As Peter Martyr Vermigli-who fled persecution in Italy-wrote, flight could be (and should be) 'wholie be directed unto this end, that we may the more commodiouslie do honour unto God, and preserve our selves, until our appointed time'. 51 The task of interpretation was complicated immeasurably by the opacity of plague to early modern observers, as a biblically inspired comparison illustrates. Ezekiel 14:21 finds the prophet in a menacing register. 'For thus says the Lord God: "How much more when I send upon Jerusalem my four deadly acts of judgement, sword, famine, wild animals, and pestilence, to cut off humans and animals from it!"' 52 Flight theologians frequently cite the verse, as when Luther asks, 'God sent his four scourges: pestilence, famine, sword, and wild beasts. If it is permissible to flee from one or the other in clear conscience, why not from all four?' 53 But this tidy biblical quartet obscures significant differences among the four phenomena. The behaviour of famine, war and beasts were straightforwardly comprehensible: the Spanish physician André s Laguna remarked that while war spared those away from the fighting, famine those who had food, plague seemed to have a (capricious) will of its own. 54 One might be repeatedly exposed to contagion and never so much as fall ill; outbreaks suddenly arose in hitherto-untouched locales. Plague 'missed some towns in its transit along major highways, some houses in its movement along a street, some individuals in its progress through a household'. 55 Osiander gives voice to the bewilderment and terror these enigmas inspired. Plague taketh hold of lyfe vnwares, and plucketh a man awaye in two or thre dayes . . . crepeth in preuely in y e darke so that no man knoweth what it is, or whence it commeth, or whyther it goeth, therfor can can [sic] no man kepe hymselfe surely from it: For yf it were in meate or drynk, it myghte be eschued: Yf it were an euel taist, it myght be expelled with a swete sauoure: Yf it were an euell wynde, the chambre myghte wyth diligence be made close therfore: Yf it were a cloude or myst, it myght be sene, & auoyded Yf it were a rayne, a man myght couer hym selfe for it. But now is it a secret misfortun that crepeth in preuely, so that it can nother be sene nor herde, nother smelled nor taisted tyll it haue done the harme. 56 Uniquely mysterious, epidemic disease maintained, indeed required, an explanatory space for the divine will. In this respect, experience fostered providentialism: 'Almightie God doeth gouerne and order naturall causes and theyr effectes . . . heereof it commeth to passe that infection toucheth not eueryone which is in daunger of it'. 57 55 Slack, 'Responses to Plague', 435. 56 Osiander, How and Whither, B7 r -B7 v . 57 Beza, Treatize, B7 v -B8 r . Medieval observers reasoned along the same lines. Ann G. Carmichael, Plague and the Poor in Renaissance Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 100-1. plague writing in the English Reformation, Ernest B. Gilman argues that 'plague is to be understood fundamentally as a language event foreshadowed by, and issuing from, the Word-an event, therefore, fundamentally discursive . . . an event that presents itself as a text to be read'. 58 I do not disagree, but would simply add that the discursive nature of plague paradoxically depended on its partial illegibility. 59 Let us not overstate the case. Sixteenth-century observers were not without insight into the plague-they had the rudiments of an epidemiology, in the sense of a knowledge of the behaviour of infectious disease. It was true that fleeing could prevent infection; it was true that some who stayed would not sicken, even with constant exposure. These empirical principles prevented blanket judgements about flight, pro or contra. Combined with the tricky theological mechanics of providence, it is hardly surprising that flight theologians hedged their bets, that Luther, invoking 2 Chronicles 34:2, condemns both the 'sin on the left hand' of neglecting one's obligations and the 'sin on the right hand' of tempting God. 60 The challenge for the individual was to thread their way between these pitfalls, and it to this balancing act that we now turn.
A Case of Conscience?
If a flight theologian was continually acknowledging the arguments for staying and for going, and qualifying his conclusions with caveats, that left little room for prescriptions. Thomas White admits as much: 'I can not defyne it absolutely, or fynallye determine the case.' 61 It was all very well to call for repentance and charity, but a decision had to be made, a decision our commentators thrust back onto their readers and listeners. At the beginning of his letter on flight, Luther writes, 'This we would humbly submit to your judgment and to that of all devout Christians for them, as is proper, to come to their own decision and conclusion.' 62 White's paratexts were equally self-effacing: 'I am not hé ere to giue out anye rules, or to prescribe preceptes of wisedome, for I am not so skilfull to teach that way: I had more né ede learne a great deale.' 63 In part, this was because so much of flight theology turned upon individual circumstances: faith, resources, the responsibilities of office, the demands of dependants and so on. Factors that restrained one person did not apply to another. Hooper rejects absolute assertions on exactly these grounds: flight 'can not be a suffycyent remedy, for there be certen persons that can not flee although they woulde: As the poorer sorte of people that haue no frendes nor place too flee vntoo, more then the poore house they dwell in.' 64 Hooper's point combines the pragmatic and the theological. Practically, flight cannot be the only answer, because it is impossible for many. For the same reason, it cannot be the only ethical option, to say nothing of a positive duty.
Even with every conceivable factor taken into account, the moral calculus ultimately yielded to the individual. Witness one of Luther's hypotheticals: 58 Gilman, Plague Writing, 73. 59 Cf. René Girard, 'The Plague in Literature and Myth', Texas Studies in Literature and Language 1974, 15, 833-50, at 848. 60 Luther, 'Whether One May Flee', 130-1. 61 White, Sermon, 78-9. 62 Luther, 'Whether One May Flee', 119. 63 White, Sermon, 7. 64 Hooper, Homelye, C2 r . Where no . . . emergency exists and where enough people are available for nursing and taking care of the sick, and where . . .. those who are weak in faith make provision so that there is no need for additional helpers, or where the sick do not want them and have refused their services, I judge that they have an equal choice either to flee or to remain'. 65 That equal choice, Luther explains, is made by individuals self-assessing: how confident are they in God's protection? 66 In contemporary English idiom, this ubiquitous move became the recourse to 'conscience'; 'it is conscience in deede that strykes the stroke of trust or mistrust, and therein euerye manne canne best tell hymselfe'. 67 Flight theology thereby taps into the dominant language of early modern English ethical thought. Learned commentators and conventional wisdom alike held that, faced with a difficult decision, the individual should be guided by the promptings of their conscience. Yet this meant more than following instincts or intentions, however good: conscience was 'an act of deliberate judgement, which could be mistaken'. 68 Conscience was unique to each person, reaffirming the individuality of the decision to flee or to stay and conferring a certain immunity from criticism. White lambastes those 'hastie to giue sentence, and do condemne their brethrens conscience, whiche say absolutely, it is lacke of faith, and altogither vnlawfull, it is to flye from God'. 69 Simultaneously, conscience made individuals responsible for their decision (and their spiritual well-being): recall Luther's statement that it was 'proper' for his readers to come to their own conclusions. Put more positively, conscience was democratising; the ordinary Christian, armed with faith and Scripture, could come to understand what God expected of them-although expert advice was often necessary. 70 Here the political subjectivity promoted by flight theology begins to emerge: the deliberative individual who is guided and persuaded, not dictated to.
Flight theology does not specify a single role for conscience, instead locating it at multiple points in the decision making process. It might initially be an interpretive tool: after weighing the relevant factors and arguments, conscience would identify the correct choice. Hence Luther's deferral to the judgement of his readers and their personal relationship with God. Equally, conscience could be a retrospective diagnostic; a peaceful conscience might indicate that the correct decision had been made, an uneasy conscience that one had erred. 71 Of course, these indicia were not infallible: they could easily be signs of complacency or over-scrupulousness, respectively. Anterior to the choice itself, Holland connects conscience and one's reaction to the plague, including among the 'most ferful signes of a most wicked prophane conscience' 'some notable horror of minde, and trembling of bodie, when some of Gods iudgements appeare'. 72 Finally, as mentioned, conscience sanctioned the decision made. Thus, those who fled persecution defended their decision by positioning it as 'an issue of conscience, rather than of political expediency or cowardice'. 73 Nor were these functions clear-cut or mutually exclusive; a single author might deploy conscience in any number of them simultaneously. Let us take Holland, whose link between a bad conscience and fear we have already quoted. Toward the end of his tract, he declares, 'Let no man go aside nor tarie with a doubtfull conscience, but when as he shal haue learned out of the word of God what his dutie is.' 74 Is this conscience as deciding factor or as diagnostic? Earlier, he dubs conscience 'a speciall preseruatiue against the pestilence'. 75 A good conscience is also a desideratum in and of itself: in times of danger, Holland exhorts his readers to scrutinise their consciences, with an eye toward 'how it may stand in the euil daie', and if the results were less than satisfactory, to 'purge it' post-haste. 76 Not all citations of conscience were geared toward decision making-although keeping one's conscience in good order would at once include and facilitate making the correct choice.
This last point highlights the circularity within the theory of conscience. Analysing the casuistic writings of sixteenth-century divine William Perkins, W. B. Patterson writes, 'Conscience seems to mean an individual's awareness of God's will and of an obligation to live accordingly. A good conscience would come from following God's directions and living a virtuous and responsible life'. 77 But conscience was instrumental in discerning those directions and thus in living such a life. Patrick Wallis characterises flight as 'a frustrating, probably irresolvable, question of conscience', but perhaps it was the very difficulty of flight theology that made it a question of conscience. 78 The invocation of conscience was not a means of solving the quandary, but a means of not solving it-solutions being, as we have seen, difficult to come by. It justified holding off from absolute prescriptions or proscriptions ('Conscience is a tender thyng, and maye not bé e touched nor troubled') and leaving the choice to the individual. 79 The circularity within conscience as a concept mirrored and legitimized the lack of directionality in flight theology.
Keith Thomas grounds 'the notion of moral expertise' upon the belief 'that a single right answer existed for every moral dilemma'. 80 Perhaps so, if we take each particular case, in all its baroque contingency and specificity, to constitute a moral dilemma unto itself. But for flight theologians, handling a genre of decision, for a broad and heterogeneous audience, it was not necessarily an abdication of moral expertise to equivocate. Especially when they remained privileged interpreters of the factors meant most to guide the conscience: Scripture and personal obligations. 72 Holland, Spirituall Preseruatiues, H2 r . Cf. Peter Martyr Vermigli, Life, Letters, and Sermons, ed. and trans John Patrick Donnelly (Kirksville: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1999), 68-71. 73 Wright, 'Marian Exiles', 227. 74 Holland, Spirituall Preseruatiues, L8 r . 75 Ibid., F8 v . 76 Ibid., H2 v . 
Psalm 91: Learning David's Lesson
It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Bible-the Word preached, prayed, sung or read-to sixteenth-century English people. That the Bible offered them 'a guide provided by God for the living of an obedient life' is incontrovertible. 81 Kevin Killeen has called biblical history 'a key, if not the key, political epistemology' of early modern England. 82 Once we move beyond this level of generalisation, however, the complexities of the period's biblicism come to the fore, complexities that flight theologians had to negotiate (and exploit) in making their interventions.
Flight theologians readily turned to biblical epidemics-the plagues of Egypt, the pestilence punishing David's census, Asa's leprosy, the extravagant devastation of the Apocalypse-as comparanda for the diseases of their own day. Through these earlier manifestations of God's will, English troubles were incorporated into the 'long series of divine punishments for sin'. 83 Sharpening the edge of such parallels was England's selfimage as another Israel, the sense of covenantal nationhood 'both mirrored and constructed by the Old Testament as history and prophecy'. 84 And plagues were only the most obvious scriptural resources: citations drawn from the entire Bible shaped every page of flight theology.
Rather than tackling flight theologians' biblicism in toto, I shall concentrate on their treatments of one key text, Psalm 91 (cited by Luther, Osiander, Hooper, Beza and Holland), as they construed its relationship to the medical crises they faced. Promising protection from disease and other dangers, Psalm 91 was a natural choice for thinking about the believer's position in times of epidemic peril-in fact the most frequently cited piece of Scripture in English plague writings. 85 Osiander and Holland's texts are a sermon and a treatise, respectively, on this very psalm. Our theologians' uses of Psalm 91 evince a familiarly ambiguous dynamic, emphasising Scripture in godly decision making, even as it became supremely difficult to produce an uncontested reading.
Concomitant with its moral strictures and theological tenets, the Bible is an account of God's relationship to the physical world, from the week of Creation to the Day of Judgment. For the early modern exegete, it was an open question whether the Almighty was still so intimately involved in his creation. Put simply, was the age of miracles over? This was treacherous confessional ground: Protestant writers tended to argue that it was, as a way of undermining Catholicism's more overt thaumaturgy (principally transubstantiation). This was not to reject divine intervention in the physical world, simply to deny such events the status of 'miracles'. The polemical effect was blunted, however, by indiscriminate terminology on the part of writers and readers of all confessions. 86 Applied to disease, the issue is again one of aetiology: were early modern epidemics direct, directed emanations of God's will, as biblical plagues had been? Physicians and How (Not) to Survive a Plague natural philosophers had long debated whether nature, the human constitution or diseases had changed since classical and/or biblical times. 87 Osiander imagines an exchange that illustrates both the uses of, and the potential for scepticism about, the Bible as sixteenth-century epidemiology: some wyll saye: Such plage toucheth no man, but those that be ordeyned of God therevnto, lyke as ther be certayne ensamples therof founde in the holy scripture: Namely, how y t Ezech. 9. and Apoca. vii. ther was sent an angel, which aforehande marked y e vertuous & electe, or euer it was charged & commaunded y e seconde angell to smyte with pestilence or other plages . . . those y t were not marked.
The German had a rejoinder ready: 'Good syr, thoughe it wente so at suche a tyme in suche places, who maketh vs sure yet nowe, that it shall therfore chaunce so in all other deathes of the country?' 88 Furthermore, the scriptural evidence was, even on the face of it, ambiguous: alongside the plagues that punished sins, there were pestilences from which the Lord offered protection or deliverance. 89 90 Let us examine the problem as manifest in Psalm 91. The psalm describes God's protection of, as the Geneva Bible has it, 'Whoso dwelleth in the secret of the moste High'. 91 A longstanding tradition, amplified by the Reformation, glossed this group as the Christian faithful. 92 Crucial for our purposes are verses 3 and 5-6:
Surely he wil deliuer thee from the snare of the hunter, and from the noisome pestilence. . . . Thou shalt not be afraide of the feare of the night, nor of the arrowe that flieth by daye: Nor of the pestilence that walketh in the darkenes: nor of the plague that destroyeth at noone daye. 93 Osiander speaks for many in seizing upon these lines as guidance for plague-time: 'whyther a man ought to flye, thereof wyll we heare the holy ghost by the prophete in this psalme'. 94 A straightforward reading would suggest that the truly faithful-the elect-cannot be harmed by pestilence. Without reiterating the problematics of plague as divine judgement, we can see some commentators cautiously adopting this interpretation. Mobilising his notion of timely and untimely deaths, Osiander writes, 'of thys vntymely death only speaketh thys Psalme, and promyseth the faythfull christen men, that they shalbe fre from it'. 95 Luther meditates, 'what harm could overtake you if the whole world were to desert you and no physician would remain with you, but God would abide with you with his assurance? Do you not know that you are surrounded as by thousands of angels who watch over you in such a way that you can indeed trample upon the plague, as it is written in Psalm 91'. 96 Note Luther's 'if'. The psalm's guarantees are conditional: they apply only to those whose faith qualifies them for a place 'in the secret of the moste High'. And so we circle back to interpretation: was faith shown by staying? Scripture itself states in no uncertain terms that Psalm 91 must not be read as granting immunity from all danger or as licensing presumption upon divine protection. It is Psalm 91 that the devil quotes during the second temptation of Christ: 'If you are the Son of God, throw yourself down; for it is written, "He will command his angels concerning you", and "On their hands they will bear you up, so that you will not dash your foot against a stone."' Christ refuses by citing Deuteronomy 6: 16, 'Again it is written, "Do not put the Lord your God to the test."' 97 It should be noted that early modern exegetes read the Psalms not simply as devotional poems or as prophecies, but as intensely personal documents produced by King David, situated (and best understood) within his biography. 98 Accordingly, Psalm 91 responded to a particular historical moment-'when the Angell of God in Dauids kingdome slew so many thousands, in that short time throughout all Iewrie', in punishment for the census (2 Samuel 24-25). David himself was thought to have contracted the disease, though he survived. 99 In one sense, these specifics only encouraged the application of the psalm to early modern circumstances, insofar as English readers identified their nation with Israel. Moreover, the pestilence in 2 Samuel was declaredly a punishment for sin, just as those of the sixteenth century were claimed to be. Holland went so far as to assert that David's purpose in composing the psalm was 'that Gods people may foreuer learne instruction by his chastisements'. 100 But what lesson God's people were to learn was not self-evident. Some made much of the fact that Scripture says nothing about David fleeing, to which Beza responded by stressing the uniqueness of the king's case.
For hee himselfe was the cause of this Plague, and woorthily so farre forth troubled. . . . Furthermore when as this plague continued not aboue three dayes at the most, what place was there left vnto him too take aduisemente? Moreouer, whyther I pray shoulde hee haue fled, when as y e plague was whote in al his dominion. 101 Yet elsewhere Beza proves ready to use the same sort of biographical details to speak to the nature of sixteenth-century plagues. Denying that disease is conveyed by supernatural ministers, he notes that David 'was taken with the Plague, whom notwithstanding we neuer read to haue been stricken with any wound geuen by the Angels'. 102 Beza's hesitation about extrapolating a universal prescription about flight, as opposed to a proposition about contagion, seems to stem from a concern with what he calls the 'peculiar circumstances'. 103 In true casuistic fashion, he writes, 'in so greate varietie of circumstances, rules for euery singular thing cannot be set downe', with 'certaine generall preceptes' the best the flight theologian can do. 104 But to refrain from making one biblical exemplar binding in all cases did not preclude using the Bible to analyse other issues.
A similar dynamic is at work in Beza's citation of his own experience with plague: When as I my self about xxviij. yeeres past was sicke of the Plague at Lausanna, and that both others of my fellowe ministers, and amongst the rest, that singular man of blessed memory Peter Viret was prepared too come vnto mee: and that Iohn Caluin himselfe also sending a messenger with letters offered vnto me all kynd of curtesie, I suffered none of them to come vnto me, least I might haue bé ene thought too haue prouided for my selfe with the losse of the Christian common wealth, which was manyfest would haue been very great by the death of so worthie men. 105 Beza does not tell this story as a model to follow-few readers counting such pillars of international Protestantism among their well-wishers-but as an instance of one of those 'generall preceptes', here a warning against rashly mingling with the infected to prove one's sangfroid. As with King David, a single case, however exemplary the individuals involved, cannot be taken as a rule of conduct, but may illuminate elements of plague-time ethics. Yet while biblical examples abound, Beza's experience in Lausanne is the only contemporary example adduced in sixteenth-century English flight theology (Holland also refers to it). 106 This is all the more curious given the close correlation between epidemic events and the publication of flight theologies (Table 1) : our authors did not lack case studies. The parallel debates over flight from persecution made ample use of 'the wider history of the Reformation', including authors' own misadventures. 107 That said, the preference for Scripture over recent experience is itself not difficult to explain: the latter was at once less universal, less authoritative, and more contentious than the former. Returning to our theme, the special status of the Bible could, like conscience, legitimize the failure to reach closure. For, Beza argues, 'vnlesse peraduenture we can anywhere in the holy Scriptures finde this commaundement expresly written, When the Plague rageth, flye not away', it cannot be maintained that flight is always and absolutely forbidden (a textbook definition of adiaphora, the 'things indifferent' vituperatively debated in Tudor England). 108 Scripture remained the primary mediator between the believer and God. It was not, however, straightforward to deploy in the service of godly decision making. A case, perhaps even a compelling case, could be mounted, but the norms of conscience discourse and contemporary epidemiology precluded a direct application of the biblical text. Thus commentators temporised, and directed their biblical reasoning toward subsidiary issues. Much the same was true of the other major factor in the calculus of flight: communal and personal obligations.
Obligations Public and Private
One of the most ubiquitous principles of flight theology is that one must reckon with interpersonal obligations: for a parent to abandon their child, for example, or a child their parent, was to imperil the soul for the sake of (hopefully, temporarily) preserving the 105 Ibid., D3 v -D4 r . 106 Holland, Spirituall Preseruatiues, C1 v . 107 Wright, 'Marian Exiles', 231. 108 Beza, Treatize, C2 r . Cf body. 'Therfore is it a great shame for a Christen man to be so afrayed for the plage of the pestilence, as to flye from them whom he is bounde to serue by Gods commaundement.' 109 In this requirement, flight theologians firmly rooted the individual in society, reinforcing the links between personal decision making and the common good-that is, the communal work of the 'culture of persuasion'.
For each resident of an infected locale, the plague was, to quote Luther, a test of 'how we should act toward our neighbor'. 110 The individual must weigh their particular bonds of propinquity and obligation, before coming to a decision as to whether and how they may flee. This process was usually organised around the distinction between 'public persons', like magistrates or pastors, and 'private persons'. 111 Although many officeholders died carrying out their duties in plague-time, others-no more than flesh and bloodmade shift to flee. In the summer of 1532, as plague raged in London, one judge reported that his colleagues were serving practically under duress and that the sheriffs had asked permission to decamp. 112 But theologians often denied even deliberation, with the implicit availability of either option, to 'public persons'. These individuals bore too many obligations to too many people to countenance flight, especially since moments of crisis made them more necessary than ever. 113 This applied equally to political and spiritual leaders, the justifications at once practical and theological ('they shalbe accompatable to almighty god' thundered Hooper, 'for all the hurte and detriment, that hath happned vnto the people in their absence'). 114 But was the prohibition absolute? Luther and Beza make exceptions if competent substitutes are available and those fleeing would have been willing to stay had need been. Beza also allows that a direct command from God or permission from one's flock might authorise an official's flight. 115 By contrast, Bishop Hooper declares, 'there be souche offyces of truste, as men for noo cause maye flee from it: As the Busshoppe, Person, Uicare and Curate, . . . and yf they forsake theyr people in thys plague tyme, they be hirelinges & no Pastoures, and they flee from goddes people into gods high indignacion'. 116 In Hooper's case, this inflexibility may stem from the bishop's personal history: he had retreated to Zurich to escape one of Henry VIII's bouts of conservatism, a decision he came to regret bitterly. 'Once I did flee, and take me to my feet', he wrote, 'but now, because I am called to this place and vocation, I am thoroughly persuaded to tarry, and to live and die with my sheep.' 117 Hooper elsewhere advanced a rigorist theology of magistracy, including the obligation to die rather than offend God. 118 And yet, biographical and theological differences notwithstanding, Hooper is no stricter than Osiander, to whom it never seems to have occurred that officeholders might flee. 119 Even as the identification of 'public persons' animates the practical work of flight theology, the very category of the 'private' starts to break down, or perhaps to be deliberately broken down. In part, the plague itself was making death a public spectacle, as the infected collapsed in the street and church bells and plague pits reconfigured the urban landscape. 120 Official measures contributed, too, by co-opting 'private' individuals for public purposes: citizens took jobs as enforcers of quarantine, while poor women worked as 'searchers', examining corpses and determining which houses were infected. 'Epidemics throw into question people's moral responsibilities to the communities in which they live, sharply emphasising the difficulties of balancing public and private interest.' 121 When the flight theologian joins in casting this wider net, we see the political dimensions of their texts. Those who fled an infected city were disproportionately wealthy, and when they departed, they 'threw the poor out of work, deprived local government of its tax revenue, and weakened its ability to exert authority', as well as diminishing the available funds for charitable works. 122 An already precarious public order was imperilled by the perception that fleeing elites had neglected their obligations. 123 If theologians could make wealthier readers more conscious of these responsibilities, such disruption might be minimised-even if they did eventually decamp.
More fundamentally, in politicising individual behaviour flight theology redraws the line marking off private from public. Having enumerated 'publike persons', White goes on to recommend flight for others, 'if they doe prouide that their neyghbours doe not lacke that conueniente comforte and sufficiente succoure whyche their presence myghte yé elde'. 124 It is difficult to find much daylight between this and the standard Luther applied to officeholders. Indeed, the Wittenberg reformer is explicit about extending such obligations:
What applies to these two offices [pastor and magistrate] should also apply to persons who stand in a relationship of service or duty toward one another. A servant should not leave his master nor a maid her mistress except with the knowledge and permission of master or mistress. Again, a master should not desert his servant or a lady her maid unless suitable provision for their care has been made somewhere. . . . Likewise, fathers and mothers are bound by God's law to serve and help their children, and children their fathers and mothers. . . . Yes, no one should dare leave his neighbor unless there are others who will take care of the sick in their stead. 125 Although Luther's account of the obligations of private citizens is the most fully elaborated, it is hardly unique. John Calvin, advising a correspondent about flight, discusses 'duty' and the Office of Magistracy', Scottish Journal of Theology, 2003, 56, 208-30. 119 Osiander, How and Whither, A3 v . 120 Jones, 'Plague and Its Metaphors', 110. 121 Wallis, 'Plagues', 1. 123 Wallis, 'Plagues', 6. 124 White, Sermon, 80. 125 Luther, 'Whether One May Flee', 122.
(vocatione) without distinguishing between the duties of family members and the duties of pastors or magistrates. 126 His proté gé Beza likewise parallels religious and civil officeholders with 'priuate persons' on account of the 'manyfolde' bonds tying citizens to one another. 127 The shift from private to public was semantically charged: while a 'private' person might justifiably act out of self-interest, what was 'public' 'embraced the common good of the "country" and the duty of every good citizen to serve it unselfishly'. 128 Lest it appear that flight theologians have finally found a firm position in opposing flight, quasi-public obligations did not foreclose the possibility entirely. When Calvin, for example, juxtaposes familial and official responsibilities, it is not to forbid flight categorically: he is clear that flight is often the proper course of action. 129 As I read it, the intention behind treating 'private' persons as 'public' is to qualify how individuals may flee. Lack of public office should not lead a person to imagine they can depart whenever they feel the impulse. Obligations to family, friends and neighbours must be satisfied-but once they are, flight is permitted (even by Hooper). 130 Permitted, and even encouraged. An expansive account of interpersonal obligations might well militate for flight. Luther, we know, had strongly worded warnings about endangering one's fellows through contagion. With the best will in the world, Beza argues, some-because of age, debility or other factors-can do nothing to aid their neighbour and should probably flee: 'if they tarry, they may seeme therefore onely too bee stayed, that they may dye too the great losse of the common wealth'. 131 As for the officeholder, the very functions that made them so useful in plague-time made the possibility of their death unthinkable. An absolute refusal to flee could prove detrimental to the civil and religious community, if plague were thereby to rob them of essential individuals. Even Aré valo grudgingly allowed that truly indispensable persons might flee. 132 A common solution, employed by Catholics and Protestants alike, was the designation of a certain number to stay, while the rest removed to safety. 133 Geneva saw repeated proposals for a lottery to select pastors for plague-time service (with irreplaceable men like Calvin and Beza exempted). 134 During the plague of 1578-79, John Aylmer, bishop of London, decided that only a few volunteers among his clergy would be responsible for visiting the sick. 135 Holland, praising such a system 15 years later, reminds the ailing of their obligation 'to preferre the health of all the congregation, before their own, and so to striue to content themselues, with the presence of such [clergymen] as the magistrates haue selected and appointed'. 136 Absent in all this has been, yet again, any resolution to the basic problem of flight. As has hopefully become clear, this is because flight theology is not always especially interested in flight as such.
pretext, he describes the apostolic healings worked by anointing with oil, and then denounces the 'madnesse' of 'Antichrist' in making unction a sacrament. 147 '[P]lague undermined any assurance men might normally find in family and friends, business and property, or even in government and nation'. 148 The prejudices of elites against the poor-that they were unsavoury, riotous, dangerous-were exacerbated; along the same fault-lines, there was resentment against those who fled on the part of those who could not. 149 In addition to invoking conscience and the primacy of circumstance, commentators avoid challenging identifiable individuals: no names are mentioned and opinions come with caveats like Beza's 'without blame notwithstanding of any man be it spoken'. 150 In part, then, flight theology was an attempt to maintain order, to prevent the populace from staying or fleeing precipitously and so causing disruption. Sometimes order was overtly political, as when Hooper urges his audience 'to obey, reuerence, loue, healpe, succour, defende and vpholde with all our wittes, gooddes, ryches and strengthe this oure onely Kinge, the Magistrates and councellours that be appointed vnder hys highnes'. 151 Flight theology made subtler political interventions by contributing to a renegotiation of the private and the public, reaffirming both the significance of private decisions to public welfare and communal claims upon individual decision making. Concomitantly, in rendering the issue one of conscience, flight theology provided a template for how the believer was to grapple with problems-through the considered judgement of religious and communal obligations-and so for engaging in the nascent 'public sphere'. Flight theology reflected the fundamental assumption undergirding the early modern English 'public sphere': that the prosperity and security of the nation and of true religion would be advanced by 'different parts of the commonwealth talking to one another'. 152 Flaring into renewed life with each outbreak, this was the episodic 'public sphere' characteristic of post-Reformation, pre-Civil War England. 153 But in contesting such questions openly and in communal terms, in (cheap) print and in the vernacular, flight theologians and their translators were reifying this phenomenon into a stable feature of English society. Thus it was that in the seventeenth century a popular flight theology came into its own, in pamphlets, broadsheets, poems and plays-not infrequently, given its political dimensions, as a weapon in the hands of 'authors outside the established Church, such as Quakers and Catholics'. 154 Perhaps anticipating such a possibility, sixteenth-century flight theologians-divines to a man-stressed the clergyman's position as arbiter. White is probably telling the truth when he mentions 'heere are manye would fayne knowe' how to resolve the dilemma of flight, but he is also modelling an ideal response. 155 That response was fostered by flight 147 Ibid., M2 v . 148 Slack, Impact of Plague, 19. 149 theology's ambiguity: unable to find a definite answer in print, the Christian was the more likely to turn to their pastor. We have already quoted Keith Thomas's claim that the 'moral expertise' at the heart of casuistry depended on every case of conscience having a single solution. Flight theology indicates the opposite may be true: moral expertise depended on ambiguity, without which there would be no need for the expert.
Finally, the communal work of flight theology operated on a purely intellectual level. As the biblical scholar Alexander A. Di Lella observes, 'The trouble with many theodicies . . . is that they are vulnerable to empirical disconfirmation'. 156 Plagues threatened the integrity of religious ideology, as painful questions of divine justice piled up. Epidemics violated the individual body, the body politic, the liturgical cycle, the familiar rhythms of life and death. 157 Some coherent theological account was required, even if only in the abstract or ex post facto. To theologise plague was to reassert the moral order governing the cosmos, to confine these mysterious, terrifying events within familiar frameworks. That flight theology echoes so many contemporary ethical discourses is no accident: underlying it all was the counterintuitive affirmation that plague-time was nothing special. As Calvin put it, 'duty must not be neglected, no more in epidemic disease than in war or fire'. 158 Scriptural precepts, the demands of conscience, and divine providence were all still in force. The commoners of London might not follow every twist and turn in the argument, but flight theology reasserted the spiritual register through which they could understand-however partially-the disaster they faced.
Just as Kirby points to the removal of mediating forces between the believer and God as creating a need for a public sphere, Gilman posits that the same void necessitated plague writing. Deprived of plague saints and penitential processions, Protestants relied first and foremost on words to reckon with their trauma: 'The vast and repetitive outpouring of plague sermons, jeremiads, and broadsheets . . . may be read symptomatically as the psychosocial form of traumatic repetition-a collaborative, overdetermined, and never completely successful effort to write "out" the plague, in both senses of the word'. 159 Flight theology was integral to this process, its power undiminished by the fact that it was 'never completely successful'.
